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Carbon Emissions from Deforestation
Deforestation remains one of the largest sources of global 
CO2 emissions, constituting around 17% of total emis-
sions  (Figure  1;  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate 
Change, 2007a). When forests are converted to agricul-
ture, most of the carbon in biomass is emitted into the at-
mosphere either through active burning, or through decay. 
Deforestation is rather common today in tropical regions 
(Brazil, Africa, Southeast Asia) and results mainly from ex-
pansion of agricultural land, including the development of 
feedstocks for bioenergy. 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (2007b), reductions in deforestation could have 
important  near-term  greenhouse  gas  impacts  and  they 
could reduce the overall costs of avoiding climate change. 
The role of deforestation in future climate policy has be-
come a prominent policy issue. At the recent Bali interna-
tional climate change meetings, countries (including the 
United States) agreed to keep the question of deforestation 
on the table during the debate about future policy after the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
This article discusses and examines arguments in favor 
and against the use of credits from reductions in deforesta-
tion in climate policy. While reductions in deforestation 
are an area of intense negotiation in international policy, 
they could easily become an area of concern domestically 
if the U.S. moves toward stronger climate policy. Several 
current legislative proposals explicitly consider importation 
of international carbon credits, some of which could arise 
from reductions in deforestation.
Arguments Against Credits from Reductions in 
Deforestation
There are a number of arguments against using carbon 
credits derived from reductions in deforestation. Perhaps 
the most important relates to economic growth. In many 
regions (e.g., Brazil), agricultural land expansion is con-
sidered an important driver of future prosperity. Standing 
tropical forests do not provide consistent annual income 
flows, while livestock or crops (including biofuels) gener-
ally do. Many developing countries have been reluctant to 
take on GHG emission caps in their industrial sectors due 
to growth concerns, and some may be similarly reticent to 
take on targets for reductions in deforestation.
Second, many governments and stakeholders believe 
reductions in deforestation would be difficult to contract, 
Figure 1. Proportion of global carbon emission from vari-
ous sources (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
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measure, and monitor. Despite all the 
advances in satellite and other tech-
nologies, it remains no small task to 
build measurement systems that track 
land-use. It is even more difficult to 
measure the carbon content in for-
ests,  particularly  remotely.  Even  if 
tracking systems can be put in place, 
designing  contracts  that  affect  land 
use is complex. Consider for example 
the “urban sprawl” discussion about 
controlling land use that has occurred 
in the last decade. While some large 
U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture 
programs  were  implemented,  it  has 
not always been clear that land use 
change actually slowed as a result of 
the programs.
Questions  about  contracting  for 
reductions  in  deforestation  involve 
a host of additional issues, not least 
of  which  are  baselines  (e.g.,  identi-
fying  areas  that  will  be  deforested) 
and property rights. Baseline setting 
is a problematic contracting issue in 
part because it is difficult to deter-
mine how much and where defores-
tation will occur in a given country 
in the future without the policy to 
reduce deforestation. Economists are 
notorious  for  debating  projections 
about any economic indicators, and 
land-use  change  is  no  different.  In 
addition,  countries  themselves  have 
strong  incentives  to  overstate  their 
baseline  deforestation  rates  because 
the  baseline  establishes  the  number 
of  credits  that  they  ultimately  can 
sell. From an economics and policy 
research perspective, baseline setting 
clearly  deserves  strong  attention  in 
the future if reductions in deforesta-
tion are to become a valid emission 
reduction mechanism. 
Uncertain  land  tenure,  or  prop-
erty rights, creates similar problems 
for  contracting.  In  many  regions 
where  carbon  credits  from  reduced 
deforestation may be developed and 
sold,  land  tenure  is  not  completely 
secure. It is not clear how two parties 
can contract for anything if the seller 
cannot  guarantee  ownership.  This 
“property  right”  problem  with  car-
bon differs from other commodities, 
such  as  timber,  where  “illegal”  logs 
are routinely marketed. The specific 
location  of  carbon  in  trees  matters 
for ensuring that payments get to the 
owners, and for verification. In illegal 
log markets, the location of the point 
of harvest does not matter, and uncer-
tain tenure and lack of control over 
the resources likely serve to enhance 
the market for illegal logs (although 
they are not the only issues). A lack 
of control over land, or an inability 
to ensure that carbon remains on the 
land if contracted and sold, in con-
trast, creates inefficiencies in making 
payments for sequestered carbon. 
Third,  many  environmental 
groups  are  concerned  that  allowing 
credits for reductions in deforestation 
could  reduce  carbon  market  prices 
and in turn, incentives to invest in 
energy  saving  technologies.  Thus, 
while deforestation reductions would 
benefit the atmosphere and mitigate 
climate change, they would also cause 
us to put off other investments. 
Arguments in Favor of Credits 
from Reductions in Deforesta-
tion
The  most  important  argument  in 
favor  of  credits  from  reductions  in 
deforestation  relates  to  costs.  Most 
economic evidence suggests that poli-
cies including reductions in defores-
tation  would  be  cost  effective.  The 
recent IPCC report suggested that up 
to 2 billion tons (1 ton = 1000 Mg 
or 1 metric tonne) of CO2 emissions 
could be reduced by avoiding defores-
tation for less than $20 per ton CO2 
by 2030. This represents a substantial 
share of global emissions over the next 
30 years and is much cheaper than a 
number of other estimates. 
The implications of slowing defor-
estation this much, this cheaply, are 
fairly large. A study by Tavoni et al. 
(2007) combined a large-scale, inte-
grated assessment model with a land-
use model to examine the relative mer-
its of undertaking forestry and energy 
actions to stabilize future concentra-
tions  of  carbon  in  the  atmosphere. 
Specifically, Tavoni et al. examined a 
550 parts per million target, whereby 
emissions would have to be curtailed 
dramatically over the next several de-
cades in order to hold concentrations 
below this level. This policy is roughly 
equivalent with allowing a doubling 
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
relative  to  preindustrial  concentra-
tions, but not allowing emissions to 
increase concentrations beyond that 
point. 
Tavoni et al. found that forestry 
actions, which include reductions in 
deforestation,  could  reduce  costs  of 
stabilizing  concentrations  by  up  to 
50% compared to an energy-option 
only  strategy.  They  show  the  “ben-
efits” of including forestry in global 
stabilization  policy  are  nearly  three 
times  the  costs.  In  addition,  there 
are a number of other environmental 
benefits, such as habitat, water qual-
ity, biological diversity, species pres-
ervation, etc. While it is difficult to 
quantify the value of these benefits, 




Is it even realistic to expect that large 
areas of land could be enrolled or in-
fluenced by carbon policy? The pro-
gram most often cited as an example 
of a successful land-use policy is the 
U.S. Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP).  Over  a  25  year  period,  the 
CRP changed the use and manage-
ment of over 36 million acres of land. 
In comparison Tavoni et al.’s results 
imply 47 million acres of U.S. land 
would need to be converted to for-
ests by 2030. The climate program is 
clearly a large program, but perhaps 
not out of the question when com-
pared to CRP.
Now, consider what the results in 
Tavoni et al. mean in South America. 
Between 2005 and 2030, the baseline 
model (without carbon incentives) in 
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million  acres  of  tropical  forestland 
will be lost in South America due to 
deforestation. With the carbon incen-
tives of the stabilization policy, only 
58.5  million  acres  would  be  defor-
ested by 2030, for a net increase of 
142.5 million acres. This change rep-
resents a 71% reduction in deforesta-
tion over the next 30 years. Is it fea-
sible to carry out a program this large 
in South America? On average, there 
are 178 tons of CO2 on each acre 
of standing tropical forests in South 
America. With  this  amount  of  car-
bon, the lump sum initial payment 
for land enrolled in a program to re-
duce deforestation would be $400 per 
acre for land enrolled in 2005 under 
the carbon prices described in Tavoni 
et al. Due to the projected rise in car-
bon values over time, land enrolled in 
2030 would be paid $2800 per acre. 
While these payments are not likely 
to compete with the net returns from 
already accessed croplands (with aver-
age yields of 40 bushels per acre and 
net returns of $100-$150 per acre), 
they could be competitive in regions 
near  the  margin  where  active,  and 
costly, land clearing is occurring. 
On the other hand, to avoid such 
large deforestation levels, substantial 
costs of design, implementation, and 
enforcement would arise – e.g., trans-
actions costs. There is some evidence 
on the magnitude of such costs. Sa-
thaye and Antinori (2006), estimate 
implementation costs to be less than 
$1 per ton CO2, but they consider 
projects that are much smaller than 
those that would need to be carried 
out under a stabilization policy.
A  crude,  but  different,  way  of 
looking at the transaction costs is to 
consider the CRP budget. In 2004, 
the Farm Service Agency total budget 
was $25.5 billion. Of this $1.9 billion 
was spent in rental payments to farm-
ers for CRP, and $1.3 billion in sala-
ries and expenses across all programs. 
CRP rental payments were about 7% 
of the total budget. If one simply as-
sumes that 7% of the salaries and ex-
penses were used for the CRP, then 
implementation costs would be $92.8 
million per year. For roughly 36 mil-
lion  acres  this  amounts  to  around 
$2.50 per acre per year. On average, 
afforested acres in the United States 
may  be  able  to  sequester  2.4  tons 
CO2 per acre per year, suggesting ad-
ministrative costs could be around $1 
per ton CO2 sequestered. 
This  is  an  admittedly  “back-of-
the-envelope” way to estimate insti-
tutional costs, but it nonetheless can 
be informative. Based on the results 
from  Sathaye  and  Antinori  (2006) 
and the calculations from the CRP 
in  the  United  States,  institutional 
costs  do  not  appear  to  be  all  that 
large  when  compared  to  the  types 
of carbon prices that might emerge 
with  global  policy.  Further,  CRP  is 
a government program, and as such, 
one may expect that its administra-
tive costs are larger than they would 
be with private party transactions. Of 
course, it is not at all obvious that the 
costs of implementing CRP in the US 
will be representative of implementa-
tion costs of similar programs in the 
developing world. Bureaucratic ineffi-
ciencies could drive these costs higher 
elsewhere (although wage differentials 
may limit this increase).
It is important to bear in mind 
that the discussion about implemen-
tation costs above focuses on a specific 
type of property right– namely, that 
landowners are considered sources of 
credits. Alternative approaches, how-
ever, are possible. For example, policy 
makers could tax emissions from de-
forestation rather than design systems 
to pay landowners to hold land in for-
ests. Yield and other types of taxes are 
routinely implemented in many de-
veloped countries, so taxation systems 
are  clearly  feasible  with  potentially 
low  transactions  costs  (self-reported 
in many cases – with high penalties 
for mistakes). Many countries, how-
ever, could find this policy difficult to 
implement politically and to enforce 
in practice. 
Worth Considering
Will payments for reductions in de-
forestation be used in the future? Any 
policy that has a nearly 3-1 benefit 
cost ratio is worthy of consideration. 
While  additional  transactions  costs 
ignored in this estimate will increase 
the costs, these do not appear overly 
burdensome.  Further,  the  potential 
additional ecological benefits of pre-
serving rainforests could be as com-
pelling as climate change itself. Col-
lectively  it  appears  that  additional 
work  on  policy  design  is  needed  if 
reduced deforestation programs were 
to  be  implemented  efficiently.  For 
example, the large literature on con-
tracting  with  asymmetric  informa-
tion provides many good insights that 
could be used to help design moni-
toring and verification systems, or to 
help design payment vehicles. 
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